All of Morocco is Seething: an interview with Ali Lmrabet (Fr-En)

‘Tout le Maroc bouillonne’

In April only, in Rabat only, police watercannoned a student-teacher’ protest against worsened contracts; weeks after, thousands marched in support of the Movement of the Rif’s political detainees; and for such support, a prominent journalist, Omar Radi, was detained by the brigade nationale de police judiciaire (‘a political force’, as Lmrabet says).

Radi was detained for Tweeting “Neither forget nor forgive these squalid functionaries!” (fonctionnaires sans dignité!), referring to Lahcen Talfi, the judge who presided over the detainees’ appeal, whose decision brought those thousands outside the Rabati parliament.

As Lotfi Chawqui wrote in October 2017, ‘the struggle for the liberation of political prisoners has become a front-line, where the authorities’ ability to remodel politics and security – to contain mobilisations – will be played out.’

Despite this ‘seething’, al-Makhzan, the permanent state, appears solid. It is not that the centre hasn’t held since 2017, but that the peripheries have endured, even in the capital – the local further realised as the national, the particular as the general.

The following interview was conducted by the Algerian daily, el Watan (‘the Nation’), and published there on the 18 April.

– JH

Contrary to other countries in the region, very little information is filtering out about the situation of liberites and human rights in Morocco. However, it’s hardly more than a week, and there are protests. What is it that explains this blackout?

Because, simply, unlike those other countries, Morocco relies on an impressive network of foreigners, based above all on corruption, blackmail, and payoffs. In France, there’s Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, Hubert Védrine, Jacques Chirac, Jack Lang, Nicolas Sarkozy, and other personalities, becoming veritable sentries in the service of Morocco.

In spain, there are the Socialists, Felipe Gonzalez and Rodriguez Zapateros, and others. There’s also Israel, which plays a non-negligable role. All this, in the service of the Makhzan.

When the revelations of the hacker Chris Coleman appeared, we discovered two things. First, that Moroccan diplomacy is entirely in the hand of the Direction générale des études et de la documentation (DGED; the external intelligence agency), run by Mohamed Yassin Mansouri, a friend of the King.

Second is that this same DGED has built a press empire in Morocco, composed of many Arabic- and French-language media groups, and that, through which,  it buys the goodwill of foreign journalists, often French, with fake, stupendous salaries.

And finally, we’re lacking Moroccan intellectuals known at the international level, who might carry the voices of the persecuted and the weak outside the country.

Look at the Moroccan intellectuals – the Tahar Ben Jalloun’s, the Leila Slimani’s, and others. They live in France, carrying themselves as democrats, indignant at-one-or-another misfortune, at the forefront of demanding rights, here-or-there. But when they cross the Moroccan border, it’s as if, you might say, the’yre struck by some strange paralysis,

Everything they find wrong elsewhere, they’re unable to find in their country of origin. For the them, the persecution of the Sahraouis, the Rifians, the [Sidi] Ifniens, the Jeradians, are details, [the minimising of which] is necessary to maintain this fake stability that’s sold to foreigners.

What then is the actual situation of human rights in the country?

The situation of human rights is as follows: there are, with names and surnames, hundreds of political prisoners in Morocco. Sahraouis, Rifians, Jeradians, journalists, YouTubers, even Facebook users.

The great Moroccan humourist Ahmed Snoussi, ‘Bziz’, banned from television for over twenty years, is currently being sued by the Minister of the Interiour for a critical post on Facebook, and for not having – get this! – for not having stopped other people sharing it on their own page.

Why is the Moroccan government recoursed sysmetically to repression? What is it scared of?

Because, in reality, it’s a colossus with clay feet, which is scared of its own population, its own society. If the army, the gendarmerie, the police and the secret services are coddled, it’s because the regime has need of them.

If certain media groups are financed and even managed by the officers of secret services, as the hack Chris Coleman revealed, it’s because [the state] wants to control the press which has yet escaped it. But, there’s a media power that it doesn’t control, being social media.

If we don’t read and we don’t heard much today that the King is well-liked and popular in Morocco, it’s because we read more and more acerbic comments, even insulting ones, about the sovereign – indignities that we didn’t read previously, when those networks didn’t exist.

As a consequence, today, Morocco has declared war on those posts and those comments on social media. Those that criticise the regime on Facebook, for example, are immediatley summoned by the police prefecture, and often tried and convicted. Social media is becoming a headache for the regime, hence this blind repression, with no one spared, not even minors.

Seen from the outside, Morocco gives the impression of being a pressure cooker, closet to exploding. Is this really the case?

It’s a pressure cooker, as was Ben Ali’s Tunisia, and Sudan and Algeria currently are. A simple question: a Moroccan now, does he live better than Tunisian before, or a Sudanuese or Algerian today? The response is ‘No’.

Social inequalities are stunning, the injustice which strikes the Moroccan people is displated every day, in the videos posted on social media. From north to south, from west to east, Morocco is boiling.

If the Movement of the Rif, which never had any politial demands, but plenty of the social ones, was decaptiated and deeply repressed, it’s because the Makhzan was scared that it wouldn’t be stop the tache d’huile, the oil spill, from spreading across the other regions, suffering the same problems.

What can you say about the state of the private press in Morocco. The indpendent journalists; do they have room for manouvere, enough to do their jobs?

We must ask the question: are there still independent journalists in Morocco? The response is ‘No’.

This is not because those indepenent journalists have sold themselves to the regime, but simply because they’re no longer able to exercise their trade.

The director of the daily Akhbar Al Yaoum [Today’s News], Taoufik Bouachrine, was condemned to 12 years in prison after an iniquitous trial, because he was one of the rare journalists to criticise – by the book – the regime.

He’s been accused of rape, of human-trafficking, but in the video we’ve been able to see, we don’t see any rape, any human-trafficking; we’re not even sure it’s him in the video.

And then, cases of rape are generally treated by the police’s vice squad, and not by the BNPJ [the force that questioned Omar Radi], which is a political police force, and which sent more than 40 officers. I repeat: more than forty police, to arrest Bouachrine in his office.

He’d not had the right to a juge d’instruction [a pre-trial hearing], his trial was begun on 8 March, International Women’s Day, and it was held in camera. And, when one of the pretend victims denied any relationship with Bouachrine, and accused the BNPJ of falsifying her statement, she was immediately arrested, and sentenced to several months of prison – and, finally, her lawyer was suspended for three months, for doing his job.

Then there’s a journalist Hamid Mahdaoui, who was recently sentenced to three years in prison, for the ‘non-denouncement of a crime’, since someone he didn’t even know called for him to announce he was going to send tank to the Rif [1]

That’s to say that whoever calls you, for a joke, or merely speaking nonsense – can you imagine a huge tank, crossing the border, to go save the Rifians? And for that, you risk three years in prison. Bouachrine and Mahdaoui have both been victims of a plot.

The Court of Appeal in Casablanca has recently confirmed the sentences given in the first instance against the Movement of the Rif’s political detainees. The local committee of the Movement at Tamasint, and the families of the detainees have, amongst other things, organised a demostration, this Sunday afternoon [i.e., Sunday 21 April], to denounce the verdict. How do you decode this judgement?

It’s as you say: it’s a political trial, which strikes at those poor people, who asked for no more than a hospital, a university, and work [a Movement slogan], and the end to the ambiant racism amongst the Moroccan forces of order against the Rifians.

There’s nothing else to it. I myself am Rifian, and have followed the revolt from start to finish. We’ve told about flags of the Republic [of the Rif, 1923-26] of Muhammed bin ‘AbdelKarim al-Khattabi, and of his portraits being shown during demonstrations.

But this forgetst that al-Khattabi is one of the national heros of Morocco – there are roads and even a dam named after him. The historians can make their inventories of what can be said or not about ‘AbdelKarim, but for the moment, he’s a Morocan national symbol.

For now, the most serious issue, and which has the most important consequences in the near and far furture, is that the hounding of the Rif has provoked, has woken up, the Rifian diaspora in Europe. We can’t count the number of demonstrations, some of them very important, which growl not only against the regime, but also against the King of Morocco, who’s considered the person most responsible for the tragedy.

As a Moroccan, how do see the contest in Algeria?

With great, enormous hope. Algeria, it’s not far off, like Sudan; it’s not the Libya of Qaddafi, or the Egypt of Mubarak, it is own neighbour. We speak the same languages, Maghrebian, Tamazight, and l’arabe littéral [Modern Standard Arabic], and we share the same aspirations for liberty, democracy, fraternity, and prosperity.

I’m appalled, when  I see men and women dead in the Mediterranean, only because they’re searching for a better life, when neither Algeria not Morocco are poor countries.

—

[1] A travesty: Mahdaoui had received a telephone calls from ‘a certain Ismaïl Bouazzati’, who claimed he wished to send tanks to the Rif. Fot not reporting such fantasia (the Movement was unarmed, had no means of transporting tanks, et cetera), Mahdaoui was charged:

“En effet, la justice marocaine a procédé à l’arrestation du journaliste sur la base de sept conversations téléphoniques dans lesquelles Hamid El Mahdaoui s’était entretenu avec un certain Ismaïl Bouazzati, ressortissant marocain originaire d’Al Hoceïma et établi à Amsterdam. Dans ces communications, Ismaïl Bouazzati avait fait part de son souhait d’introduire des armes et des chars d’assaut sur le territoire marocain, des propos que le patron de « Badil » a jugés complètement insensés expliquant qu’il n’a, de ce fait, rien caché aux autorités. Lors de son audience le 27 juin dernier, le journaliste a refusé que les enregistrements téléphoniques soient réécoutés.” As reported by Solidamar, 6 July 2018.  

Maghrebians United to Support the People of Algeria!

Originally in French, the following declaration was shared by the poet and militant Abdeltif al-Lʿabi (or Laabi) on 25 March.

Morocco’s name in Arabic (‘al-Maghrib’) is a near homophone of the ‘Maghreb’, used in both French and English to suggest something like the “northwest and north African region”, including Mauritania, Libya, and perhaps an independent Western Sahara, as depending on political orientation.

That the core ‘Maghrebian’ countries – Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia – have had divergent (though not discrete) trajectories since independence is undeniable: Michael Willis’ summation — ‘conservative Morocco, revolutionary Algeria, constitutional Tunisia’ — is not entirely misleading.

However, undeniable also is the sense — noticeable amongst the popular classes of Morocco, certainly — that there is something artificial and even objectionable about this national differentiation of peoples. There is a shared a history (not least, of French imperialism and its defeat); a shared culture (including, but not only, varieties of Islam), shared languages (Darija; the Amazightphone range; French); and — perhaps the heart of the matter — a similarly ‘closed’ official politics and social structuring that, in different ways, and at different speeds, are being militated against as never before across the three countries.

Al-Lʿabi was a leading editor of Souffles (and its Arabic successor, Anfās), the avant garde cultural and political review founded in 1966, in Morocco. The image above is taken from the second issue of the Souffles.

His introduction to the declaration is below, italicised; a list of signatories – scholars, writers, artists, and activists — is available here.

– JH

Maghrebians United in Support of the People of Algeria

The call that follows was composed at the initiative of academics who, for a long time, have militated together for a plural Maghreb. It was then assented to by intellectuals, artists, political militants, and community organisers from across the Maghreb and the diaspora. I signed it ‘with two hands’, and I invite all those convinced by it to give it the largest possible audience.

We, the undersigned, partisans of a plural Maghreb, heirs of the values and the dreams of the originators of the l’idée maghrébine: those who transcended the colonial divisions of the North Africa, and who cried aloud the strategic articulation between liberation from the colonial yoke and the unity of peoples, prosperous and citizens, of the Maghreb — “let us proclaim solemnly our faith in the unity of the Maghreb” (Tangier Conference, 27-30 April 1958).

We declare, with force and conviction, our full solidarity with the struggle of the Algerian people to reclaim their own sovereignty, until now kept from them.

We denounce all form of exterior interference in the struggle of the Algerian people and every attack against their free expression, their unity, and against peace in Algeria, and everywhere in the Maghreb.

Observing that despite the political experiences since independence — which have not realised either the unification of the region, nor the democratisation of public life, nor a sustained human development — the dream of a Maghrebian form remains, nevertheless, alive. Still better, it is becoming a hope than might exist in the current world, when there had once been no place for such grand regroupings, as cemented through acting for regional solidarities

The people of our Maghrebian region, from Mauritania to Libya, are expressing – continuously, through various ways, in public the space — their aspirations for dignity, for rights to life, for democracy, for equity, for sustainable development, for an equality of chance, for women’s and young people’s rights, with respect for rights, and an active, social solidarity. By their actions and demands, they give form to tomorrow’s Maghreb: the Maghreb of citizens. We feel ourselves part of them, and, with them, we launcheourselves towards this promising Maghreb. Through their struggles and their aspirations, they revive the conscience maghrébine of the regions founders.

Only yesterday, it was at the initiative of the Tunisian people that the people of the Maghreb, especially their youth, descended onto the streets to protest against the despotism and to demand, loudly and powerfully, the foundation of the modern societies, of solidarity and democracy, and the creating of states based on rights, as cemented by popular legitimations, freely expressed and collectively established

We then followed in Morocco of the 20 February Movement and the Hirak [Movement] of the Rif. And today, it is the Algerian people and it’s youth who are relaunching the process of liberation, and who receive the spontaneous support of the Maghrebian peoples and their youth.

We commit ourselves to the following:

• That the processes of democratisation and modernisation of the states and socieites are not trapped by and used towards reproducing despotism.
• That the choice to free, pacific expressions of the popular will should not turn towards mistakes that “justify” violent interventions from despots and their security apparatuses.
• That the Maghrebian people not have to make the nefarious choice between despotism and chaos.
• That this conscience maghrébine transcends all tendency towards isolationism, petty-minded patriotism, clanism, and other clientalisms
• That the socialisation of young generations is not based on denying the Maghreb, on a narrow patriotism, and the hatred of the other, but, on the contrary, that the basis of this socialisation is a Maghrebian citizenship.
• That the compatibility [complémentarité] between resources and humans be exploited to the profit of Maghrebian well-being, particularly through diverse mutualities and innovative partnerships, against the current dilapidation of these human and materials capital. [1]
• That the Maghreb be a place of peace, where the tranquility [quiétude] and security of the citizens and the peoples are guaranteed, initially from a determined, broad adherence to the citizens’ construction of the Maghreb, followed by the promotion of a culture of dialogue and the searching for convergences.
• To the institution of frameworks that seek compromises, arbitrations, and resolutions for disputes and conflicts. This would prevent every slide towards violence, and all terroist temptation
• That the Western Sahara conflict which, in its non-resolution, not only harms the strategic interests of the people of the region, but also the peace of the Euro-Mediterrenean-African region — to find a way just political solution, that is equitable and consensual. We affirm that whilst the Saharan question is complex, a Maghrebian solution to the problem is possible. We are ready to participate in its elaboration, in the strategic interest of the people of the Maghreb, the Mediterranean, and Africa. For us, the Western Sahara should be a means towards a Maghreb, and not a place of war of destruction and war.

We proclaim our total and unconditional support to the Algerian people — in this phase of unstable globalisation, there is no other than a Maghrebian salvation.

—

[1] The original of this unfortunate passage is as follows:

“(P)our que la complémentarité des ressources matérielles et humaines soit exploitée au profit d’un bien-être maghrébin, notamment par des mutualisations diverses et des partenariats innovants, contrairement à la dilapidation actuelle de ces capitaux humains et matériels”

‘A Whole With Many Parts’ – Lotfi Chawqui on Social Movements in Morocco (En-Fr Translation)

Below is draft En-Fr translation of Lotfi Chawqui’s essay ‘The Social Awakening’, as published in Le Centre tricontinental’s recent special issue, ‘État des luttes – Moyen-Orient et Afrique du Nord’.

As Colin Barker argued in his 2013 ‘Class Struggle and Social Movements’, such movements:

i) Are a ‘collective achievement’; they ‘transcend atomised ways of coping with problems engendered by capitalism’s working’.

ii) Are ‘reticulate’, or ‘network-like’.

iii) Are internally complex, or ‘fields of argument’.

iv) Are affected by their opponents.

v) Are ‘neither necessarily “bottom-up” nor “progressive”‘.

And, for Barker, there is a need to appreciate these specific movements as themselves streams of (a broadly-understood) class struggle: as elements of the social movement, ‘a whole with many parts, moving — at variable speed and with different success — towards a condition where it might engage in capitalism’s total overthrow.’

It is this need that Chawqui responds to, in his figuration of the ‘specific’, ‘local’ upsurges that, since the 20 February Movement (2011-2012), have increasingly characterised the Moroccan scene.

Photo by Hicham Gardaf.

– JH

Morocco: the Social Awakening

Whilst the 20 February Movement (20F) did not change the fundamental balance of power in Morocco, it nevertheless initiated the politicisation of a new generation, returned the question of shared struggle to politics, and opened space for a collective re-imagining, based on dignity, freedom, and social justice: the lead weight of impossibility was lifted.

Even if the King, the real power in the country, was not the direct target of the mobilisations, there was a de-sacralisation of his position and his status, and against the omertà of high office. Taken together, these laid a path for further developments.

2011 led to cosmetic changes to the constitution, and the arrival in government of the Parti de la justice et du dévelopement (PJD), together represented as addressing social concerns, and so the end of institutional reform — but, the very contest that motivated these democratic motifs was to be no more [n’a plus lieu d’être]. What followed was the haranguing of militant groups, attacks against the independent press, the repression of social conflicts, and the redrawing of lignes rouges.

A wave of counter-reforms was launched: a reduction of price subsidising and the liberalisation of prices; huge redundancies in the private sector; restrictions on hiring and reduction of investments in the public sector; the privatisation of the teaching and health sectors; and attacks against retirees — the state’s revanchisme combining an authoritarian turn with the logic of economic predation.

The Movements

Though social movements had started to occupy public space even before 2011, the current moment expresses a multiform ‘social awakening’, in which the struggles are massive, prolonged, and determined.

The organising against Amendis [France-based privateer] in Tangier over October-November 2015 — against the privatisation of electricity provision – was based on a popular assembly, involving residents of both the peripheral and central areas (artisans, café owners, traders, and so on). Developing from a series of grievances in the working-class quartiers, the emergence of civil disobedience — it was named ‘the Candle Revolt’, after its nighttime processesions — and a shared slogan (Amendis dégage!), showed the continued existence of the spirit of 20F.

After, between September 2015-April 2016, the mobilisation of the Coordination Nationale des Enseignants Stagiaires (National Coordination of Trainee Teachers; CNES) and student doctors displayed novel features. Against the reduction of grants and the threat of ending automatic enrollment into public-sector work — clearly the attempt was to create a more flexible workforce, in both the education and health sectors — these mobilisations had a union-like character, with coordinations based on locally-elected (rotating, recalledable) representatives, and the will to defend both education and health as public rights.

And in Maroc inutile — ‘useless Morocco’; the rural, Tamazight-speaking spine of the country— several movements have too polarised the moment.

The ‘Movement of the Rif’s (October 2016-) platform of demands, developed through popular participation, have expressed a diversity of social issue and broached the democratic question, especially against repression and militarisation. The Movement has combined central initiatives with peaceful guerilla tactics, taking actions at different places and different moments, thereby outplaying classic repressive strategies.

Building its own narrative, based on a collective history and memory, Hirak has had a greater political import than a simple single-issue movement. Both through its forms of mobilisation and the legitimacy acquired through the presence of ordinary citizens, it has affirmed the need to go beyond the protocols of protests. Through it’s popular basis and its endurance, it has demonstrated the possibility of social movements without mediation – Hirak then speaks to social issues in their generality.

As democratic questions were raised against the violence exercised daily by the state, as fused with social questions, the political fracture should not be understated: refusing the canals of co-optation and ‘dialogue’ with representatives and institutions without real power, it has put the monarchy itself into question. Thereby exposed, we should not surprised at the violent repression, at the collective punishments of the population, or that the instigators of the struggle are considered as ‘internal enemies’.

The ‘Movement of Thirst’ in the southern town of Zagora (September 2017-) was, like the Rifian uprising, criminalised, and showed again that repression alone doesn’t suffice, since it cannot address social issues. In Zagora, the privatisation of water, in an area already subject to water shortages, benefited only tourism and large-scale agriculture; the population though has no right to anything but intermittent water, that’s both high cost and poor quality. Despite numerous promises, the inaction of the local authorities aggravated the situation, and generated mobilisation across the town.

In the northeastern town of Jerada (December 2018-), the closing of coal mines at the end of the 1990s destroyed the social and economic tissue of the place, condemning people to clandestine work in the decommissioned mines, for a low, irregular return, as dependent on the good will of the barons du charbon [coal dealers]. With the wind coming from the Rif, and following the death of two youth in the mines, a mobilisation developed around an platform of concrete demands, with a series of ‘civil directives’ organically connecting organisers to various social layers. One of the principal slogans was the possibility of an ‘Economic Alternative’ [the most explicit ‘social’ call in the current period]

More recently, a nationwide boycott campaign illustrated the growing diversification of registers of action. Following a call on social media in April 2018, a anti-price rise developed against three companies, all of which are understood as headed by patrons de Sa majesté (the King’s Bosses): against Afriquia, the chain of petrol stations owned by millionaire Minister of Agriculture, Aziz Akhenouch; against Sidi Ali, the bottled water brand owned by Miriem Bensaleh-Chaqroun, President of the employers’ union (Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc); and against Centrale laitière, a subsidiary of the France-based Danone — all three making superprofits through monopolising their respective markets, with the support of the public powers.

This combination illustrated both the domination of foreign capital and crony capitalism. Finding a huge popular echo, the boycott expressed the refusal of the unequal redistribution of wealth and the subordination of public powers to the Big Millionaires. That this register didn’t have a regional-territorial dimension should make us circumspect; and the absence of organisation leaves it a target of co-optation, and its identified actors as targets of repression – but, the campaign revealed the division between the pays légal and the pays réel.

New Areas of Contest

This geographic extension of mobilisations and variety of sites of struggle express a more general anger. The trigger may be unexpected, but the general, emergent characteristics indicate a profound reconfiguration of protest —

The Rise of the Margins: The combination of growing social and regional inequalities is the basic framework of the major social movements (of the Rif, of Zagora, and Jerada). And, in a country in which the larger part of the population and, especially, the youth, are the ‘informal proletariat’ — living in either precarious of unemployment — the forms of possible mobilisation aim towards the street, where different expectations are combined. ‘The Rise of the Margins’ then is meant in both a spatial and social sense:  these movements are from regions excluded over the long-term from the ‘development’ processes, where both the range and urgency of social issues are foundational to shared social life.

Silmiyya! Pacifism!: Both the people’s rights and their needs — however modest — are in contradiction with the accumulation regime and the class relations it structures. But, social demands are met with a security response, in turn inducing a political radicalisation.

The general demand for pacifism derive in part from a historical memory of state repression. It responds to the necessity of the constructing a prolonged, popular mobilisation — support within society — and of delegitimising the state and its repressive strategies.

These social movements are, from their own experiences, developing objectives, tactics, and designating adversaries, in the search for both a unity of action and to catalyse popular support. They are experimenting with a way of doing politics via struggle, through social questions from the base.

Women Rising: The mobilisation of teachers and trainee medical personnel has been composed largely of young women; the Movement of Zagora was largely initiated by women; in the struggles against the demolition of homes and expropriation of lands, women are the most visible; and in the Rif, women they have played a determinant role in the social extension of the movement, and in [building] the visibility of the struggle for the liberation of political detainees.

La désobéissance civile: Civil disobedience has become a practical reference for popular confluences. Non-authorised actions; collectively refusing to pay electricity and water bills; camping in the ruins of demolished homes and on expropriated lands; boycotting elections, companies, and imposed ‘dialogues’; crossing Red Lines; breaking the taboos of the patriarchal order; opposing ‘legitimate’ to ‘legal’ — such acts reconstitute jurisprudence in the long recomposition of collective representation.

Towards a Political Crisis?

Demands for social justice, liberty and dignity link the social movements, with a logic of rights and of needs opposed to the established order.

‘Long Live the People’ is not simple rhetoric, but rather the demand of a citizenry articulating rights, as against allégeance. With dignity, it affirms a refusal of dehumanisation, in which anyone’s life might end in a refuse truck or down a decommissioned mine; it realises the social unification of disparate experiences and interests, of naming and categorising a condition which the regime both nurtures and hides.

The regime is now confronted with a crisis without precedent. The democratic façade, the traditional means of legitimation, the recourse to repression — none allow the regime to do anything more than contain the growth of social contestation. Politics, institutions, and the figures of la caste are now contested in the street and at the ballot box.

The combination of a social and political crisis leaves the monarchy without credible protections; it’s discourse announces that ‘it is responsible for nothing’, whilst all the world knows that ‘it decides everything’. As the social questions moves onto the political terrain, lines of defence are raised — the political period announcing itself is of major and decisive confrontations, against the myth of ‘Exceptional Morocco’.

Public declaration of the “Collective of Lawyers in Support of Hirak’s Accused”

The following declaration was published by the Paris-based, left-leaning l’Humanité, on Wednesday 16 January 2019. It was collectively written.

Solidarity with the accused of the Hirāk al-Rīf, and to all political prisoners.

“Despite the rain, the lightning and the thunder, the notes rang out as clear as a bell. The bird sang as if intoxicated, as if possessed, as if wishing to drown the thunder, to illuminate the twilight” – Rosa Luxemburg, Letter to Sophie Liebknecht, May 1917.

– JH

Déclaration conjointe du collectif d’avocats en soutien aux accusés du Hirak

On 28 October 2018, in al-Hoceima, fishmonger Mohasin Fikri was crushed to death in a refuse truck, whilst attempting to recover swordfish the police had confiscated.

A large protest movement named ‘Hirāk’ [‘Movement’] then swept the Rif region. This revolt, which presented the demands of an historically neglected region, was brutally repressed by the Moroccan state. It led to the arrest of 400 peaceful militants, 53 of whom, considered the leaders of the movement, were transferred to Casablanca, detained, and harangued.

Between the 26-28 June 2018, after an unjust trial, a Casablanca court condemned these 53 militans to long sentences, including up 20 years in prison. Local and international observers have denounced the grave attacks against the rights of the Hirak militants – their arbitrary arrests; their rights to legal defence – that have occurred throughout the process.

Worse still, medical examinations have shown that the accused were both threatened and beaten during their interrogations at the headquarters of the National Criminal Police Brigade. Their sentences are thus based on confessions extracted [under torture] by the police. Amnesty International compiled and published these grave violations, in a report released 17 December 2018.

43 of the 53 of the Rifian militants have submitted an appeal against their convictions. Their trial began on the 14 November 2018 and continues today at the Casablanca Court of Appeal, where the Hirak militants appear in opaque glass cages, and so without the possibility of properly claiming their rights.

Against this criminalising of social movements, Moroccan lawyers view their defence of the Rif’s accused as hindered. This is why we, the undersigned, express our full solidarity with the accused of the Rif, and their lawyers. We call again for the Moroccan judicial authorities to respect for each of the accused the right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by the international treaties – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights – to which Morocco is a signatory.

We demand in particular that the ‘confessions’ obtained under torture, or following violence, by the Moroccan police force under torture are made inadmissible. The hounding and the sentencing of  peaceful activists, engaged in the defence of their social rights, in Morocco as in France, is an unacceptable attack on the democratic functioning of our societies.

Signatories:

Anis HARABI (Barreau de Paris) Matteo BONAGLIA (Barreau de Paris) Adrien MAMERE (Barreau de Paris) Dominique TRICAUD, former member of the Conseil de l’Ordre (Barreau de Paris) Martin MECHIN (Barreau de Paris) Xavier COURTEILLE (Barreau de Paris) Eduardo MARIOTTI (Barreau de Paris) Xavier SAUVIGNET (Barreau de Paris) Alice BECKER (Barreau de Paris) Aïnoha PASCUAL (Barreau de Paris) Amel DELIMI (Barreau de Paris) Hugo CADENA (Barreau de Paris) Christelle MERCIER (Barreau de Lyon) Nathan LAGUERRE (Barreau de Port-au-Prince) Chirinne ARDAKANI (Barreau de Paris) Raphaël KEMPF (Barreau de Paris) Vaïté CORIN (Barreau de Paris) Lamia EL FATH (Barreau de Paris) Camille IDAS (Barreau de Paris) Pierre HEDDI (Barreau de Paris) Lucie SIMON (Barreau du Val-de-Marne) Augustin NANCY (Barreau de Paris) Pierre KAMPF (Barreau de Paris) Xavier HERNANDO (Barreau de Paris) Véronique CHAUVEAU (Barreau de Paris) Danielle MERIAN, Avocat honoraire (Barreau de Paris) Dominique ATTIAS, former Vice-Bâtonnière de l’Ordre, Membre du Conseil de l’Ordre (Barreau de Paris) Muriel LAROQUE, Avocate honoraire (Barreau de Paris) Adelaïde JACQUIN (Barreau de Paris) Guy AURENCHE, Avocat honoraire (Barreau de Paris) Raoul Marcelo SOTOMAYOR (Barreau de Paris) Ridouan Ait Chikhali (Barreau des Hauts de Seine) Safya Akkori (Barreau de Paris).

Years of Summer – on the recent student protests in Morocco (Ar->En translation)

On Friday 26 October, the Moroccan government, formally led by the PJD’s Saadeddine Othmani, decreed that the country would no longer shift between summer time (GMT+1) and winter time (GMT), but instead retain GMT+1 throughout the year.

Law #2.18.855

On Wednesday 7 November, the day school holidays finished, secondary school students across the country protested against the (non-) change. The New Arab wrote that ‘(p)arents complained that their children had to leave home for school when it was still dark outside’; France 24 quoted a parent on the difficulties that schools’ new timetable would present for working-class families – ‘there is a disconnect between what those above us – who impose these decisions – want, and the reality on the ground’.

Over the three day that followed, 1000s-strong crowds of students marching through the larger cities, with footage of children facing-off police, and, most transgressive of all, of teenagers trampling the Moroccan flag, outside the gates of Parliament in the central Rabat.

The following article was published by al-Munadil/a (‘the Militant/e’) on November 12, on the third day of the protests.

Translated from Arabic by NM and Joe Hayns; the image is of Hicham Gardaf’s 2016 work, “The Red Square”.

—

School students, the new generation carrying the torch of struggle

School students’ struggle continues against the government’s decision to make GMT+1 the permanent, official time.

School-aged youth have taken to the streets across of dozens of cities and towns, protesting to force the government to back down on its unjustifiable decision, one that the labour unions have already opposed.

A new generation in practice

These current demonstrations represent a new dynamic, one that emerged after the mass struggles rejecting the Masār program [1].

This new generation is engaging in struggle, and therefore praxis, for the first time. Initially the mass of protestors marched together, chanting loudly, but without precise slogans, without organisation or equipment, and often with no specific destination.

Little by little, the slogans have become clearer and more expressive, and the demands more precise. The protestors started using simple tools, improved their communication, co-ordinated gathering points, and decided on their routes. The protests themselves are a school of struggle, where experience is compounded, and expertise shared.

These new struggles are showing greater strength than their predecessors. New channels of co-ordination between institutions and new media technologies are being used to agitate and organise.

This experience will forever be engraved in the memories of the participants. It will normalise the spirit of insurrection and struggle against oppression and, for the youth, draws a path towards the fight against this repressive, exploitative regime.

The importance of the current struggle

These protests continue our people’s struggle for dignity, freedom and self-emancipation against corruption and despotism, and suggest that the future of popular struggle is promising.

The current student struggles are at the core [في صلب] of popular, public debate, since they concern every family – and their consequences will be politically crucial.

The state watches, manoeuvres … and represses

The façade government’s unilateral decision has faced widespread rejection by the working masses [2], who understood the decision from a simple, deep, class viewpoint: “they [the government] decide according to what fits their living conditions, which are antithetical to those of the people’s.” [3]

After growing dissatisfaction, the government attempted to absorb popular anger with its usual trick of dividing the ranks of its opposition, in this instance through excluding the educational sector from its decision: but students’ anger is fighting to abolish the decision altogether.

If the current struggles continue, the state will use its other well-known methods. It begins with ignoring, then watching – and then follow with sham talks and debates. A media campaign starts, smearing activists as ‘nihilists’, ‘seditionists’, as ‘agitators’ of students, as ‘saboteurs’ who have no connection to the school, as people who failed academically, or were expelled. Finally, repression and arrests, and a campaign of ‘sheikhs’, ‘colonels’, and informers threatening families, forcing them deter their children from participation.

Never submitting to the demands of ‘its subjects’, tightly grasping its ‘prestige’, the state despises the people, whom it will ignore, deny, and repress – whom it will not submit to, without a greater, encompassing struggle.

Let struggle continue, solidarity spread, and demands broaden

In order to impose the demands, the struggle must continue; students must organise mass debates in their institutions, in order to understand the truth of the state’s decision, the general school conditions, and to crystallise central, unified demands. Creating webpages and fora for students may prove worthwhile.

But this student battle must gain trade union support, starting with the education unions immediately concerned, and also of the families harmed by this recent decision, and by the state’s educational policies more generally. Most important is the need to prepare to counter the state’s manoeuvres, which will escalate, as the fight escalates.

Refusing the current policy is an explosion of the once-latent discontent of students, crushed by the state’s destruction of public education, by widespread unemployment, and the thwarted hope of a true homeland, one that does not force them to die in the middle of the sea, escaping the hell that it has become [4].

Only a broad mass struggle will force the rulers to submit to the voice of the people!

Victory to the student struggle!

!النصر لنضال الشبيبة المدرسية

—

[1] “This new system allows parents to follow the educational development of their children via schools’ websites”, wrote a February 2014 Tel Quel article, before quoting Anas Hmam, then-General Secretary of L’Union des étudiants pour le changement du système éducatif: “it’s not against Massar that we should mobilise, but against the entire education system, which is in ruin.”

[2] “حكومة الواجهة” – quite literally “façade government”, in reference to the use of parliament and parties by the “real” power in the country, the Palace.

[3] The translators are unable to find the original quote.

[4] A reference to the murder of “Hayat B.”, who was shot by Moroccan marines whilst attempting to cross the Mediterranean. Her late-September killing provoked protests in her native Tetuwan.

Movements: Hirak and Migration [1/?]

The following is a draft Fr->En translation of Issam El Yadari’s 20 September article for the Morocco-based, more critical news site, le Desk. It’s original title is Des rifains, graciés par le roi, demandent l’asile politique en Espagne (‘Riffians, pardoned by the king, demand political asylum in Spain’). Thanks to the author, and editors.

—

Hundreds of Riffians, the majority of whom are militants or sympathisers with Hirak [the Movement of the Rif], have fled over the last weeks aboard pateras de fortune*1 from Morocco to Spain, where some have demanded political asylum, claims the Spanish-language newswire EFE. 

“It is impossible to obtain precise figures, since all the voyages are made in secret”, but various sources consulted by the EFE in both the Rif and Spain confirm that “the number of boats that have left the Rif’s coasts are without precedent, even compared with the previous year, when police repression was stronger [notoire]”

InfoMigrants claims that 17 young Moroccan activists who participated in social protests in the Rif region have crossed the Mediterranean for Spain, and are now claiming political asylum.

The case of the Annabi brothers

The EFE cites amongst others the case of two brothers from Imzouren, Mohamed and Ibrahim Annabi, who were amongst the 186 Riffians imprisoned during the protests which shook the region in 2016 and 2017, and then pardoned by the King Mohammed VI on the 20 August this year.

The Annabi brothers, accompanied by a third, who was also pardoned, have made contact with their families, and assured them they have arrived safely in Spain.

These two brothers appear in one of the numerous videos which have circulated on social media in which Riffians are seen on the Alboran sea, chanting Hirak political slogans, such as such “Death with Dignity, Above Live with Humiliation”, and “Change or Martyrdom!”. However, according to sources close to them, the Annabi’s do not intend to demand asylum, and rather are searching for employment and a decent life.

According to sources cited by Tel Quel, the Minister of the Interior Abdelouafi Laftithas opened an inquiry into the sharing [diffusion] of videos showing Moroccans clandestinely cross the Mediterranean, which are considered as an “incitation” to clandestine immigration.

A common pool to leave Morocco

In order to charter a crossing, Riffians collect money together and leave together for Spain with a “Captain”, who has some navigation experience. Others put themselves in the hands of the mafias, who they pay €500 to take them to the shore, and €50 more to take them to friends in Spain.

Anwar, 33 years old with a stable job, has prepared a guide in Rifia, which has been distributed as an audio file through WhatsApp, with practical advice on what an asylum applicant should do once they arrive in Spain.

However, he recognises that “very few” Riffians have obtained refugee status. Three cases are known, two in Spain and one in Belgium. More than a hundred people are known to have demanded asylum, all of whom are now waiting in immigration centres in Motril, Malaga, Valence, Melilla, and Murcia, amongst others places.

Sources from the Commission espagnole d’aide aux réfugiés (CEAR) say that the procedure of granting asylum takes a maximum of six months in Spain, and affirmed that each case is studied, and that the Riffian origin of applicants in not sufficient criteria to grant asylum.

Military service: a new reason for exile

The same source recognises that counting Riffians as refugees may be a “diplomatic bomb”, for what it would suggest about Spain’s attitude towards a neighbour that Madrid officially describes as a “model”.

The organisation SOS-Racisme is one of the organisations helping Riffians with concrete aid on their arrival to Spain, both logistical and legal. One of its members, Youssef Ouled, himself a Riffian, has declared that over the last months, very few Riffians have been expelled for Morocco [by Spain].

On the reasons for his compatriots’ exodus, Ouled referenced “structural problems in Morocco, such as corruption and inequality”, adding that, over the last weeks, a further reason has appeared: the law re-establishing obligatory military service for youths aged between 19-25 years old.

—

*1. As they’re referred to in the Youtube video linked above, قوارب الموت , or ‘the Boats of Death’

 

The state, the Rif, and the diaspora – a translation of Ayad Zaroual

Below is a Fr->En translation of an essay from Ayad Zaoual, published by Mediapart on the 12 July. 

A month after the sentencing of fifty three of the Popular Movement of the Rif’s (‘Hirak‘s’) leading activists;  a week after ‘tens of thousands‘ protested ‘for the freedom of all political prisoners’ in Rabat; and a day after a substantial demonstration in Barcelona for the same, Zaoual’s essay is on the political-economic relationship between Hirak, the Rifian diaspora, and the Moroccan state (‘al-Makhzan’)

An irony of the historical relationship between the three is that the very marginalisation and repression that drove and still drives emigration in the post-independent period has produced a large, active Rifian diaspora, across Holland, France, and Spain, whose remittances have become a salient regional and indeed national economic fact. How exactly this fact – billions of them, each year – is distributed and redistributed is, as Zaoul shows, a political question (one that prison sentences leave entirely unresolved) – under-developed, the Rif needs emigrants’ remittances; and as a means to ‘development’, the state needs the Rif’s deposits.

I have retained Zaoul’s use of ‘le pouvoir‘, ‘the power’, in distinction with ‘the government’, and the French word ‘Médiatisation’ – the ‘popularization through the (mass) media’, as Larousse defines it.

– JH

In Morocco, the crisis of the Rif: why does the pouvoir distrust its diaspora, and their intervention in the debate?

What’s at issue in the confrontation between the Makzhan and the revolts of the Rif – what’s been as yet unrecognised – is the fact of domination of a high-emigration region as a supplier of economic rents: remittances.

This context is crucial for comprehending the violence of the Makhzan, and the punishment of the ‘revolts of the Rif’, despite their legitimate grievances. As emphasised by Béatrice Hibou – and with the state driven by the economy – the control of remittances is a mechanism of economic oppression and of domination.

Le pouvoir distrusts its diaspora: a ‘den of opponents’

The trial of al-Hirak is also a punishment of the interference of the diaspora, through its alliance with the popular Movement, and it’s médiatisation of it. Hidden behind the accusation of al-Hirak’s ‘secessionism’, and of it’s coalition with ‘the Outside’ is, in reality, the ambiguity of relations between the diaspora and the Makhzan.

In a context of political precarity, and of the return to authoritarianism, distrust is becoming the political marker of a regime that sees, in the diaspora’s interference and their alliance with Hirak, a nest of opponents (nid d’opposants) – a new actor, controlled only with difficulty by public powers, and capable of mobilising attention at the international level.

And indeed, since the explosion of revolts in the Rif, we’ve seen the growth in power of the diaspora in the debate, via a fabuleux ‘Digital Hirak’, which has, unquestionably, brought the precious service of médiatisation. It has brought too a political conscience, a strong sentiment of collective membership, and a re-appropriation of the debate, defining novel forms of citizenship and engagement, entirely ignored by the pouvoir.

The control of rent: remittances

In a context of articulation of the Moroccan economy at the international level – of the ‘discharging’ [of public functions] to the private sector, and the precarity of development aid – the control of remittance transfers is a major issue in the management of political order, and the economy. As underlined by Pierre Vermen, what is at issue in this region of emigration is the control of ‘rent’ – but, due to a partitioning and a dispersing of the Rifian community, any politically-inclusive debate about such control is prohibited.

Indeed, so long as they stick to sending money to brothers, sisters, and parents, the remittances of the marginal regions was applauded with both hands – and seeing the sums involved, one sees better why.

The last study of the World Bank of migrations and money-transfers is clear: in 2017, Moroccans transferred close to €6.6 billion to their country of origin, itself much more than state development aid to Morocco, estimated at more than €1.7 billion, and larger even than direct foreign investments, assessed as close to €2.3 billion. Note that these remittances represent more than a quarter of commercial bank deposits at the national level – and the Rif Oriental region, with it’s high emigration, they can reach 60 to 70% of deposits.

The accusation of Hirak’s ‘separatism’ is a means of the Islamist government and the pouvoir to refuse the diaspora’s entry into the debate over the development of the Rif; the Makhzan fear this emerging, mass consciousness (intelligence) turning towards the human development of the territory.

We have seen this same aversion of the state to coalitions on the terrain of development aid, where local [state] actors mistrust projects involving migrants’ NGOs. And, conversely, the state’s large-scale development projects – the Programme Concerté Maroc (PCM)*1, or the  projects of the Agences de Développement dans le Nord (APDN)*2 – have been met only with apathy by local populations.

The clearest indication of this trustee-like relationship of the state towards the Rif is the official creation of ‘territories of tomorrow’s development’, recommended by the editors of the document ‘Economic Integration’, from the Schéma National d’Aménagement du Territoire (SNAT). The institutional means it suggests is simple, but, for the Rif, redoutable; the colossal financial deposits of the marginal regions – those around Nador and al-Hoceima – will henceforth serve as a resource to finance the economic development of the large, functional metropoles, at the expense of the Rif. This specific territorial governance of the territory, to be ‘instituted’ over fifteen years, will have disastrous consequences for the Rif.

The revolt of the Rif essentially expresses this reality, of ‘disintegrated development’, itself based on an ideology of political dispersion and of control of remittances; the Rif has been for too long trapped by the state’s incomprehension of the local fabric and territory, and of people’s leaving for the city [de départicipation à la cité] – but, today, Hirak has enabled the emergence of collective, popular consciousness, turned towards human development and local democracy.

The young don’t want to listen to either imams or élites – but the Islamist government and the pouvoir deny this questioning, and any Rifian coalition organising local, endogenous development.

—

*1 The PCM, a project generating ‘co-operation between French and Moroccan civil society, for a human, solid development’, according to PCM’s 2014 report.

*2 The APDN is ‘mandated to propel a dynamic of development and territorial promotion’ in provinces in the Moroccan north, including the Rif (the APDN’s site is here).

“Jerada-Hoceima: the same fight!” – an essay by Lotfi Chawqui (Fr-En translation)

To mark International Workers’ Day, the following is a translation of an essay by Lotfi Chawqui on the continuing protest movement in the ex-mining town of Jerada, as published last Saturday by the France-based New Anticapitalist Party.

It is clear that in his mature work, Marx considered the word ‘Worker’ as properly designating not only miners, but also those left after the mines are closed, with the ‘relative surplus population’ being the grouping that ‘every worker belongs to during the time when he is only partially employed or wholly unemployed’. Worklessness is not a negation of worker-ness, but rather an immanent feature of the working-class.  And, contrary to the para-Fanonist sense of the workless – the ‘lumpenproletariat‘ – as necessarily disorganised, and preferable for it, it’s become only clearer over the last two years in Morocco that even those from the seemingly ‘stagnant’ sections of the surplus population are able to politically collect themselves.

If that ‘stagnant’ sub-section of the working-class labours through ‘extremely irregular employment‘, as ‘characterized by a maximum of working time and a minimum of wages‘, then the UK too has seen an increase of their organising over roughly the same period, albeit very largely through trade unions (Bectu’s Picturehouse efforts,  IWGB’s Senate House and also Couriers’ campaigns, BFAWU’s McStrike, the various anti-casualisation groups within UCU, and so on).

Together, this suggests the need to further develop on the seams of theory that realise the collective potential of tendentially workless Workers, as they organise both inside of outside trade unions.

Maroc : Jerada-Hoceima : même combat!

For more than a year, al-Hirak (‘the Movement’) of the Rif has, in its mass, peaceful, determined character, shown in broad daylight the depth of popular discontent – and the political crisis of a power incapable of responding, even partially, to its elementary demands.

As the trials of the core leadership of the struggle [lutte] near the end, everything indicates the regime’s will towards heavy sentencing, intended as a warning to all those who luttent.

But in Jerada, situated in the east of the county, nearly three months of popular mobilisation was set in motion, following the death of two young men in a coal mine.

Profound discontent in Jerada

Jerada, as one of the most impoverished towns in the country, is known for its worker and militant traditions. It was here that one of the first unions was born during the colonial era.*1 The regime [le pouvoir], under Hassan II, ordered the closing of the mines at the end of the 1990s, not for economic reasons, but to destroy a working-class bastion, known to have lead important struggles. But, whether directly or not, mining gave life to the whole town, and the promises of an adjustment strategy have never been acted on. Dependent on alternative employment, many continue to descend into the ‘mines of death’, disaffected, their lives imperilled, to extract coal by hand, without any security measures, in order to sell it for only a few dirhams to the ‘barons’*2 and the local elect.

The mobilisations have been recurrent in the town, notably over the question of employment, but also over water and electricity. The death of the two youths did no more than catalyse a deep discontent. Like the Rif, Jerada is a Movement, for an ‘economic alternative’*3, with concrete demands around employment, public services – in particular, hospitals offering free treatment for silicosis – and reduced water and electricity costs, including cancellations of unpaid bills. As in the Rif, a platform of demands has been elaborated on through the participative approach of the local population.

Social and Political Polarisation

The regime has feigned a “social dialogue”, sending different ministerial delegations with announcements of agricultural projects, a new industrial zone, a review of water and electricity rates – but, they are all appear cosmetic [apparues comme de la poudre aux yeux]. Following the mobilisation, the Movement (of Jerada) has expressed, as in the Rif, a loss of trust in the system’s channels [relais], and in the democratic façade. The response has been a violent police intervention on 14 March, causing dozens of injuries, and the militarisation of the town, as has been seen in al-Hoceima, with arrests – 74 so far – and sentences.*4

This situation confirms a cycle to which the country is returned: a social polarisation and of political belief, through relatively self-organised popular struggles, speaking to social questions through direct mobilisation, and refusing of the mediations of those indebted to the dictator – and towards which, the monarchy can only use repression [et dans lequel la répression apparaît la seule issue pour la monarchie], being without the measures to extinguish the fire smouldering across the country.

Now [alors] that Macron has received Mohamed VI to a private dinner, which was followed by royal communication on the pursuing and re-enforcing of co-operation on every level, it is urgent that a movement of solidarity is developed with the struggles of the people of Morocco, with the political prisoners, and against the dictator.

– Lotfi Chawqui

—

*1. See this English-language essay from Latifa Babas, published in late December by Yabiladi.com, on Jerada as the crucible of trade unionism in Morocco.

*2. See Tel Quel’s 3rd January Arabic-language article ‘“Barons” of coal in Jerada: the whole truth‘

*3 . In Arabic, ‘بديل اقتصادي’, as is written on protestors’ placards in the image above.

*4. See Tel Quel’s half-reliable 19 March article on this.

 

 

‘We feel weak’ – a second interview with Hirak activist ‘Yassmin B’

In her first interview with this blog, on the 6th July last year, Movement of the Rif (‘Hirak’) activist ‘Yassmin B’ explained Hirak’s ‘chen-ten’ method – ‘a contemporary development on the guerrilla tactics that our grandfathers excelled’ – and that Hirak involved, from the first weeks, ‘the descent of women to the street’. Below, she explaiuns life in the Rif today, 9 months on.

The first phase of Hirak began with protests against the killing of Mohasin Fikri, in al-Hoceima, in late October 2016, and ended with Nasser al-Zafzafi’s interruption of a Friday sermon, in the town’s Mohamed V mosque, in late May of 2017 (‘is this a house of God, or of the Makhzan‘ [‘the state’]?). Phase two began with the state’s ‘decapitation’ reaction that weekend – arrest the leadership, including al-Zafzafi – and the popular response, of nightly, scrappy demonstrations across the Rif, throughout the summer.

Phase two culminated with the July 20th demonstration, in al-Hoceima again, involving 10s of 1000s of people from across the Rif, Morocco, and Europe, with the diaspora visiting for the summer. It was a ‘day-long political win‘ – from then on, protests’ size decreased, as police numbers grew, with the number of Hirak prisoners into the mid-100s – ‘the struggle for the liberation of political prisoners has become a front-line‘, as Chowqui Lotfi wrote in October, suggesting how dangerous chen-ten had become.

Into winter, I asked a Moroccan friend whether ‘people in al-Hoceima are still angry, and together, in the streets?’ – ‘no, there’s too much repression’. ‘So they’re angry, but in their homes?’ – ‘N’am; Iawa?‘ (‘Yes; so?’)

To say that the Movement is restricted to the ‘private’ sphere is largely correct, with two qualifications. Firstly, the parliament, the courts, and the licensed media – ‘public’ institutions – have been, and presumably will remain, entirely hostile towards Hirak; similarly, ‘public’ space in the Rif was only ever intermittently under ‘sh’abi’ (‘popular’) control. What’s changed since phase two appears to be quantitative, not qualitative – harder institutions, longer sentences, more police.

The second caveat is that whilst the Rif, especially al-Hoceima and Imzouren, is the ‘centre’ of the Movement, the Movement itself continues across Europe –  France, Holland, and Spain/Catalunya – through diaspora groups, who are able to organise relatively freely.

N’am; Iawa? As ‘Yassmin B’ explains below, this is a perilous time in the Rif – certainly the most difficult since October 2016, and perhaps for some time before that; there’s only so much scattered Europe-based groups can do, with their own organisational issues, against prowling riot vans in Imzouren, and an (at least) partly corrupted judiciary in Casablanca. It remains clear though that the Moroccan state’s inability to address social dysfunction – it’s inability to address calls for a ‘a hospital, a university, and work’, as they are in the Rif – except through baton charges, and shamelessly illiberal sentencing, is a sign of ill-health, possibly profound; that the working-class in Morocco – across the country, in al-Hoceima, and Zagora, and Jerada, and Imider  – can’t but demand these things is a sign, oppositely, of a post-2011 vivacity.

For further news on Hirak, follow Hirak News Casablanca

—

Could you tell us about the 20th July demonstration? How was that day? Were you surprised by the size and the energy of the crowd – and how did the police behave?

For us, on the 20th July, the repression wasn’t that big a deal – we were used to it, after the two months before, especially the eid al-Fitr demonstration [on this, see Hicham Aidi’s essay],  in which the police had repressed us with gas, because of the size of that demonstration.

On the 20th July, we were prepared for everything. We were skeptical, of course, but also hoping that the police would not use their full power against the people, because of the international press which was present at that time – we know how our government tries to show how democratic they are.

But, they did. They used violence, and the locals were not surprised – we always know their truth. We were not surprised by the size and the energy of the crowd, either, since, again, we were used to it by it then. Months of sometimes weekly demonstrations have made us experts.

There are now many, many Hirak comrades and friends in prison, some on hunger strike – could you explain a little how people in the Rif have tried to help them over the last six months, since July?

We are not exaggerating when we say there are hundreds of prisoners. It’s the reality, and yes, that means all of us know at least one person, through family, or neighbours or friends.

Yes, everyone can help, but only through our families. You have to know the circumstances of a prisoner – their daily needs in prison, the needs of their family as they travel to visit them – since no one can donate publicly, as this will bring danger. As a society we tried our best to demonstrate as much as we can, to show them our support.

It’s not only uniformed police working against al-Hirak; there are also ‘al-Hanash’, ‘snakes’, who change their clothing. Do you have anything to tell those of us in Europe about the more illusive of security services there – about this kind of repression?

We are used to them now. Maybe most of the Moroccan citizens that have come are policemen.

As locals, we started noticing that hundreds of strangers were filling up the center of city; these movements coincided with the imprisonment of hundreds of young people, and the escape of hundreds more, mainly to Europe.

It’s rare to have a local who works with the police, or the more secretive security.

That is why we easily notice them [the latter], firstly because we live in a small city and, secondly, because they don’t look like around like us – they are always watching everything around them – and, of course, they don’t speak our language, thirdly.

You find them in the beaches, restaurants, cafes, shops, beauty salons – literally everywhere, trying sometimes to provoke, or tease us with some comments.

We think that the state is trying to change the ethnic majority, one that facilitated that harmony in the al-Hirak. We are convinced of that – anything is possible.

Today, we take a walk in the city of al-Hoceima and Imzouren, it’s not only the sadness; there is also anger and loss. We feel weak. The remaining young people are avoiding some areas, and are full of sadness and anger over the imprisonment of their friends and brothers – this is al-Hoceima of 2018.

The first ‘large-scale conference on the topic of the dire situation in the Rif region (Morocco) in the European Parliament‘ was organised recently, the 28th February.

How do people in the Rif speak about the various left-wing parties in Europe, in the European Parliament, who might offer solidarity with the Rif? Are you optimistic about help from those parties?

We are glad to hear about some solidarity movements and conferences in Europe, especially from some personalities – this makes our cause better known, and puts our system in a more revealing light.

We can make a separation between the support of some European parties with us, and the international connections of our government with the European states.

But are we really optimistic? Here in al-Hoceima province? Unfortunately, no.

 

 

 

 

Catalonia and the Rif – an interview with CUP Guíxols

The following interview is with the Sant Feliu de Guíxols Local Assembly of the Candidatura d’Unitat Popular (CUP), the radical left, pro-Catalan independence party, on their demonstrated and continuing support for the Popular Movement of the Rif – a type of support that, I believe, distinguishes the CUP from most, if not all, parties across Europe

That the memberships of the Communist Parties of Algeria and Morocco were, initially, largely European is relatively well-known, and extent that the Moroccan CP and the wider left were changed by European refugees, who ‘streamed across the Pyrenees into France and across the Straits of Gibraltar’ in the later 1930s is becoming clearer.[1] As yet though, the ways that generations of Rifian, and Moroccan, and Maghrebian migrants have related with progressive forces in Europe is far less well appreciated, at least in the English-language writing on migrations to and from the region.

It’s because of CUP’s anti-racist, pro-migrant politics that  ‘Spanish ultra-nationalist forces’ called for a demonstration outside the party’s Barcelona HQ yesterday – ‘we will not stop our political activity because of fascist threats’, as the CUP responded.

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Lots of the Riffian diaspora across Europe returned to the province and protested in al-Hoceima on the 20^th of July –  the largest demonstration in the Rif since Hirak began, for sure.

But, both parliamentary and extra-parliamentary left groups in France, Spain, Holland, German, have not been so supportive of Riffians in Europe. I’ve still not heard of a trade union actively helping a Riffian diaspora group. 

How important has the Riffian diaspora been for Catalunyan independence? How have the CUP attempted to support that diaspora, and the struggle in the Rif more generally?

It’s true. The big states’ lefts didn’t support the Rif people or the Catalan people. In fact, these lefts are not truly left-wing any more. For thirty years, the social democrats haven’t fought against capitalism. They have agreed with the neo-liberal framework. The same with the bigger trade unions.

In a lot of cities – Girona, Barcelona, Mataró, Sant Feliu de Guixols, Vic – the CUP has supported the Rif movement’s demonstrations. The CUP has supported the Rif movement, especially during the campaign for ‘Yes’ in the Catalan independence referendum, and in talks, and demonstrations. And, the Rif movement have supported the Catalunyan independence movement’s demonstrations, too.

The CUP MP Carles Riera, who is now first on the electoral list for the 21^st December elections in Catalonia, came to Sant Feliu de Guíxols for a conference on solidarity with the Rif people, and against racism.

The CUP organised an international meeting with members of the left movements – from Poland, Scotland, Ireland, Palestine, Kurdistan. Yes, there were members of the Rif movement too.

Despite being in some ways similar – radical-regionalist movements against a central state – the Rif and Catalunya are hardly ever considered together, at least in the Anglophone press. Are they part of the same broad process? If they are, what would you call that process? Can we look forward to Catalunya becoming a province of the Republic of the Rif?  

We believe that we are a part of a same process: Mediterranean peoples that rise against oppressive states, monarchies, and bad economic situations. But, the press doesn’t say that.

The Catalan press didn’t talk about Rif people. The press and the neo-liberal politicians speak about Africa like it is 1000 miles from Europe – but is only 14 kilometres. Catalonia will not be a province of Rif. And Rif will not be a province of Catalonia. But we need solidarity.

And not only in the fight for freedom – we need economic solidarity and economic agreements for building an alternative to the capitalist EU economy.

When there was the Rif War [1921-1927, roughly], begun by the Spanish State, the Spanish Government sent young working-class people to fight and die in the Rif. But in Catalunya, and especially in Barcelona, the working-class people made strikes and raised barricades in the streets against the war. The strikes were repressed with a lot of violence by the police. You see, the relation between Rif and Catalonia is long.

The Catalunyan independence movement is politically mixed. There is a tendency of Catalunyan chauvinism amongst the right-wing, even if that this chauvinism is politically different from the Spanish form against it.

The CUP though seem to be internationalists, with anti-racist and pro-migration politics; the party fights hard against detention centres, for example.

In the UK, the Labour left and the left-wings of larger trade unions are for sure ‘pro-migration’, but those organisations cannot go beyond the political horizon of the capitalist state, which requires migration controls – they cannot argue for ‘No Borders’. They can invoke Marx to defend this position, however selectively.

Is the ‘No Borders’ demand a necessary part of Marxist, communist politics, or only ultra-leftist posturing?

It’s true, there is a right-wing of the independence movement. They practice the austerity and economic agreements against working-class people. But, in every election, they have less power since now.

And the majority of the independent movement is built by left-wing people or, at least, people that want a better economic condition and more rights.

The majority of the independence movement are not chauvinists. The majority want to build a new Republic for the working people, with public services, with education and social care.

What does the say CUP say about borders? We say they are only a problem for the poor. If you are rich, you can cross borders without problems. In ‘rich countries’, borders are not problems. You can go from France to Belgium without problems. Borders are a racist regulation. We have to defend the free movements of people.

When people from Africa or South America or Asia come to our countries, they have worse labour conditions than people born in Europe. They have fewer rights – to public health, or the right to vote. We have to fight too for equal right for everyone. We see that as a global fight against capitalism, which causes wars and poverty.

Yes, it’s necessary say ‘No Borders’.  It’s basic for the left. The left cannot agree with the neo-liberal framework. But, obviously, we cannot remove all the borders until we have the socialism. That is a long fight. 

The institutions and ideology of ‘Municipal Socialism’ was near-enough destroyed in the 1980s in the UK – the last big fight was the Greater London Council versus the Thatcher governments in that decade (two friends recently joked that this was ‘a very British system of dual power’).  

Now, councillors, councils, even mayors are severely fiscally curtailed – submitting a straightforwardly anti-austerity budget would see them deposed by central government. Britain-based readers may remember the shameful treatment of the now ex-mayor Lutfur Rahman in 2015.

CUP’s ‘municipalism’ is very strong. Could you explain a little of how you practice ‘municipalism’ – perhaps ‘localism’ is better? – in relation with anti-racism and pro-migrant politics

Municipalism is correct. It’s the word that we use here. The municipalism is where the CUP was born, and we are strong is this respect. Here too, the Spanish state is attacking the City Councils, and every time they have less power.

CUP has for a long time, in cities like Salt, that have a lot of immigration, been fighting for the right to vote in local election for immigrants. In the Parliament too, CUP has denounced the Spanish state for the Ceuta and Melilla borders, were the police shot with rubber bullets at immigrants that were crossing the border, swimming in the sea.

A lot of CUP members participate in an organisation called Unity Against Fascism and Racism, that destroyed almost all the votes for racist political parties in the Council elections. CUP has supported in the Parliament, in Councils, and in demonstrations not only the rights of refugees, but also denounced too the assassin EU.

There is municipal level-work against racism.  In Barcelona, the CUP has supported a small trade union of peddlers. In Vic, where a lot of immigrant people work in a slaughterhouse, where there are a lot of accidents and bad labour conditions, the CUP has supported the strikes and fight for jobs. And in Badalona, in the Council elections, in the left slate in which the CUP was, was also the first women Muslim councillor in Catalonia, in 2015.

Every day, and in every fight, the CUP people and immigrant people are fighting together, and we support each other. There are a lot of people born outside of Catalonia that are members of CUP.

The hostility of the Spanish state, its parliamentary attendants, and the Spanish-language press towards Catalunyan independence surprised many outside the region and country – perhaps this surprise comes from a sense that ‘European civilization’ is, well, civil.

Was it 900 injured? We saw photographs of blood, someone’s blood, on a ballot box.

Along the southern and especially eastern littoral of the Mediterranean though, the state’s barbarism is more blatant, including of course the EU’s, the US’, and so on. There was an outside chance of German tanks in Athens, once again, in 2015 – in the event, capital didn’t require that much against Syriza.

Should the Europe-based left think more about the barbarism of civilization, do you think? Is the ‘Syrianization’ of European politics really unthinkable?  

Yes, the day of the independence referendum there were 1000 people hurt. A boy lost his eye when the Spanish Police shot rubber bullets. The next day, there were fascist attacks on people, and the Catalan Radio.

It’s true that a lot of people trust in ‘European Civilization’, since the press and the big political parties say this. And the left and social democrat have renounced to fight against EU and capitalism. But we know that capitalism is always violent.

Often in Europe it’s necessary for the capitalists to use direct violence. But, there are a lot of kinds of violence. Poverty, and the control of the economy, the lies of the press, racism, the unfair laws, the fear. But when there is not enough to control the people, as with the Catalan independence movement, they have no problem using direct violence.

The Catalan movement was totally peaceful, and the Spanish State has stopped it a little. But we know that the Spanish state always has to use violence for keep its unity. The Spanish state had to use state terrorism against the Basque country. The Catalan government announced that the Spanish state had threatened us with ‘dead in the streets’ if we keep going on with independence.

As to the EU, every day, there are more and more people that realize that it is not a democracy, and that it only defends the banks and the big states. But, only the CUP commits to anti-EU speech, since we are anti-capitalists and anti-racists.

 

The CUP’s popularity only grew after the rejection of Catalunyan demands for autonomy by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 2010 – you won 10 seats in the regional parliament in 2015. Over this year, you’ve attracted only further working-class support.

CUP ‘goes slow because it goes far’ – are you going quicker now?

 Yes, things have changed since the 1st of October, the day of the independence referendum, and the massive strikes of the 3th of October and 8^th of November.

Although we still go slow, because we know that is a large and difficult fight. Independence will take time and a lot of work, as we’ve always said. But we are prepared to fight, and every time, we are more people.

 

 

 

 

[1]
[1] The quote is from Rachel Alma Heckman’s unpublished 2015 PhD thesis, Radical Nationalists: Morocco Jewish Communists 1925-1975. The entire thesis is available here.